






Valuing Farmland Protection with Choice Experiments That Incorporate Preference 




Robert J. Johnston 
Department of Economics 
Clark University 
 
John C. Bergstrom 
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics 





Robert J. Johnston 
George Perkins Marsh Institute 
Clark University 
950 Main St. 
Worcester, MA 01610 




Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 
2010 AAEA,CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting,  Denver, Colorado, July 25-27, 2010. 
 
Copyright 2010 by Robert J. Johnston and John C. Bergstrom. All rights reserved. Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 




Robert J. Johnston is Director, George Perkins Marsh Institute and Professor, Department of 
Economics, Clark University.  John C. Bergstrom is Richard B. Russell, Jr. Professor of Public 
Policy and Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, The University of Georgia, 
Athens. Support provided by USDA/CSREES/NRI Grant “Improved Information in Support of a 
National Strategy for Open Land Policies,” the Georgia Agricultural Experiment Station. 
Opinions belong solely to the authors and do not imply endorsement by the funding agencies.   
  
 
Valuing Farmland Protection with Choice Experiments That Incorporate Preference 






Although mixed logit models are common in stated preference applications, resulting welfare 
estimates can be sensitive to minor changes in specification. This can be of critical relevance for 
policy and welfare analysis, particularly if policymakers are unaware of practical implications. 
Drawing from an application to agricultural conservation in Georgia, this paper quantifies the 
sensitivity of welfare estimates to common variations in mixed logit specification and assesses 
practical implications for policy guidance.  Results suggest that practitioners may wish to 
reevaluate modeling and reporting procedures to reflect the welfare and policy implications of 
common but often unnoticed variations in model specification.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Stated preference (SP) welfare analysis of farmland preservation policies, including 
purchase of conservation easement (PACE) programs, can be complicated by substantial 
preference heterogeneity across respondents. Evidence suggests that values for identical 
preservation policies can vary both in magnitude and sign across individuals (e.g., Bergstrom and 
Ready 2009; Johnston et al. 2001).
1 Choice experiment analyses of farmland and rural landscape 
preservation in US (Johnston and Duke 2007, 2008, 2009) and non-US (Campbell 2007; 
Columbo et al. 2007; Columbo and Hanley 2008; Scarpa et al. 2007, 2009) contexts suggest 
similar preference variation.  Such patterns, along with shortcomings of traditional multinomial 
logit models (Train 2009), have led to the rapid adoption of mixed logit (ML) models and other 
methods better able characterize preference heterogeneity in these and other policy contexts.
2 
Although ML models are now common in valuation applications, scrutiny of these 
models reveals a variety of often-overlooked concerns.  These include potential sensitivity of 
welfare estimates to minor changes in model specification, including the assumed distribution of 
random parameters (Balcombe et al. 2009; Hensher and Greene 2003).  Johnston and Duke 
(2007) identify such patterns in a case study of farmland preservation, although they do not 
quantify implications for welfare estimates.   
Despite the potential sensitivity of welfare estimates to minor changes in model 
specification, “many of the ML applications in the environmental and resource economics 
                                                 
1 Estimated WTP for farmland preservation in the US can vary according to numerous policy and methodological 
factors, including farmland type (Johnston and Duke 2007; Bergstrom and Ready 2009), the jurisdiction in which 
preservation occurs (Johnston and Duke 2009), the welfare measures considered or valuation methods applied 
(Johnston et al. 2001; Ready et al. 1997; Boyle and Ozdemir 2009), attributes of the policy process (Johnston and 
Duke 2007), and many other factors.  As related welfare patterns have received considerable attention in the 
literature, they are not emphasized here. 
2 The two most common means of introducing individual preference heterogeneity to discrete choice modeling are 
mixed logit (ML) and latent class models, neither of which has been shown to provide broadly superior forecasts 
(Provencher and Bishop 2004). Both approaches overcome many of the behavioral limitations of traditional 
multinomial logit models (Hensher and Greene 2003; Train 2009). 2 
 
literature have paid insufficient attention to the implications of model choice” (Balcombe et al. 
2009, p. 226). As noted by Layton and Lee (2006), common applications calculate willingness to 
pay (WTP) for only a single or small number of model specifications chosen on the basis of 
various statistical tests and unpublished preliminary models, with little indication of the 
robustness concerns discussed by such authors as Hensher and Greene (2003), Balcombe et al. 
(2009), Scarpa et al. (2009) and others.  This can be of critical relevance for policy analysis, 
particularly if welfare estimates and policy guidance are sensitive to the “econometric fine print,” 
and if policymakers are unaware of this sensitivity. This issue is of greater relevance for ML 
models than for older forms of SP estimation, both because of the increased flexibility of these 
models, the potential sensitivity of results to small and perhaps unnoticed variations (Hensher 
and Greene 2003), and because of the rapidly increasing number and complexity of possibilities 
for model estimation (Layton and Lee 2006).
3   
The published literature addressing such concerns tends to emphasize methodological 
aspects of the problem, including novel approaches for model selection (Balcombe et al. 2009), 
averaging (Layton and Lee 2006), and estimation (Train and Weeks 2005).  However, given the 
widespread and increasing use of ML results for policy guidance, applied policy implications are 
also crucial.  Specifically, is the valuation literature conveying confidence in WTP point 
estimates that is unwarranted given the potential sensitivity of these estimates to minor changes 
in ML specifications?  Lack of broader insight into such issues leaves practitioners with 
uncertainty regarding the confidence that should be placed in reported welfare estimates, 
particularly when based on results from a single model.  Such issues may be particularly relevant 
for policy contexts such as farmland preservation, for which past work has shown significant 
                                                 
3 Some of the challenges leading to WTP sensitivity can be ameliorated by solutions such as modeling preferences 
in WTP space (Train and Weeks 2005; Scarpa et al. 2007), but such approaches remain rare, in part due to “mixed 
results regarding the appropriateness of undertaking estimation in WTP space” (Balcombe et al. 2009, p. 228). 3 
 
implications of preference heterogeneity for welfare estimates (Johnston et al. 2001;  Johnston 
and Duke 2007, 2009; Campbell 2007; Columbo et al. 2007; Columbo and Hanley 2008). 
This paper quantifies the sensitivity of welfare estimates and practical policy guidance to 
common and often minor variations in ML specification. The analysis purposefully emphasizes 
specifications common in the literature and often used for policy guidance.  We emphasize that 
the purpose of this paper is not to advance methods for ML modeling or model selection.  
Rather, the goal is to address practical policy implications of increasingly ubiquitous welfare 
estimation methods. The analysis is based on a choice experiment application to agricultural 
conservation easement programs in Georgia, an application typical of the context for which 
preferences are likely heterogeneous and for which ML estimation is warranted.  Results show 
that differences in welfare estimates across model specifications for the same data and site can be 
of similar magnitude to welfare differences found across different sites in the benefit transfer 
literature—highlighting the relevance of the challenge.  These and other results suggest that 
practitioners may wish to reevaluate widespread modeling and reporting procedures to reflect the 
potential implications of common but often unnoticed variations in model specification.  Results 
also show, however, that some aspects of policy guidance are more robust. 
 
II. A RANDOM UTILITY MODEL OF CONSERVATION EASEMENT CHOICES 
We begin with a simple choice model where a choice is made between alternative levels of a 
commodity, in this case either a PACE program, which we will refer to as Program j, or a 
baseline level of conservation (no program or the status quo), denoted by Program 0. The 
respondent chooses Program j over Program 0 if  
Uj(zj, I - Pj)  >  U0(z0, I),      [ 1 ]    4 
 
where Uj(·) and U0(·) are utility levels attainable with (vector-valued) program characteristics 
zj ≠ 0 and z0 = 0, Pj is the price of zj, and I  is income.
4 Within the familiar random utility 
context, Un(zn, I – Pn) = vn(zn, I – Pn) + εn for n = {0, j}, where the observable component of 
utility is given by vn(·), the unobservable component by εn, and the price of the status quo P0 = 0. 
Following standard approaches, the εn are assumed to be stochastic utility shocks with a known 
distribution, modeled as random errors within the econometric model. 
If the observable component of indirect utility can be approximated as a separable and 
linear function v(zn, I – Pn) =   
 α + γ(I – Pn), the probability that one will choose Program j over 
Program 0 is given by  
 Pr(Uj(·) > U0(·)) = Pr((  
 α - γPj) >(ε0 – εj)) = Fε0-εj(  
 α - γPj),     [2] 
where Fε0-εj is the distribution function of the difference between shocks ε0 and εj.  If the n are 
assumed independently and identically drawn from a type I extreme value distribution, model 
coefficients β = {α, γ} may be estimated using the standard conditional logit (CL) model.  
Equating utility levels and solving for price yields a compensating surplus measure, or an 




         [3] 
The simplicity of the CL model rests on the assumption that individuals both in the sample and 
population have identical characteristics; that is, for all individuals i,  βi  =  β        Ω. This 
assumption is unrealistic for many contexts, including that of farmland preservation.  The 
imposition of a constant parameter vector across the population can also suppress variations in 
welfare relevant to policy development.  Moreover, strong assumptions regarding the distribution 
                                                 
4 We assume that the presence or absence of a farmland protection program is unlikely to significantly change one's 
consumption of other market goods or services, and that hence the modeled utility-optimizing behavior is local. 
Therefore consumption levels of other goods is considered constant. 5 
 
of utility shocks within the CL model disallow correlations among multiple survey responses 
provided by the same individual, a common feature of SP surveys in the literature. 
A mixed model relaxes the assumption of respondents being identical, replacing it with 
less restrictive assumption of respondents being identically distributed. This implies that βi ~ 
D(θ)       Ω ,where D(θ) is a multivariate distribution of a known form. If the distribution 
is a generalized extreme value distribution, the model may be estimated as a ML model. The 
general theory and methods of ML modeling are well-established (Train 2009). The most 
common form is the random coefficients model (McFadden and Train 2000), which the 
decisionmaker’s objective function is linear in coefficients and shocks are independently and 
identically distributed (IID).  The framework is easily extended to accommodate panel data, i.e., 
multiple correlated responses per individual.  Additional advantages include a less constrained 
utility structure that does not impose the often problematic independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) property on choice probabilities. 
 
III. SPECIFICATION CHOICES IN MIXED LOGIT 
ML models allow for coefficients on attributes to be distributed across sampled individuals 
according to a set of estimated coefficients and researcher-imposed restrictions.  Even within the 
linear, additive, main effects utility specifications common in SP modeling, model estimation 
requires that researchers determine which coefficients in the utility functions should be 
randomized and the distributions that characterize these coefficients.   This includes specification 
of bounds on coefficient distributions and the form of correlations, if any, between random 
coefficients.  Although some specifications allow for randomization of the entire coefficient 
vector, in practice researchers often randomize only a subset of coefficients.  While statistical 6 
 
tests can in some cases help researchers determine initial candidate sets of random coefficients 
(McFadden and Train 2000), these tests are of low power with difficult-to-retrieve critical values 
(Hu et al. 2006).  Moreover, it is possible that competing model specifications could have similar 
statistical fit, yet generate divergent welfare estimates (Layton and Lee 2006).  
As a result, determining specifications for ML models involves both quantitative 
assessments and researcher judgment.  Still additional choices are made when simulating welfare 
estimates from model results (Hensher and Greene 2003), a challenge reported in a farmland 
preservation context by Johnston and Duke (2007). Although the practical relevance of these and 
other choices are often overlooked by the applied valuation literature, effects on welfare 
estimates can be substantial (Balcombe et al. 2009; Hensher and Greene 2003).  While some 
authors have promoted various forms of model averaging as a solution, these are not commonly 
found in applied analysis, perhaps because of fear among practitioners that such approaches will 
lead to a perception of results as “fragile” or “arbitrary” (Layton and Lee 2006, p. 80). 
Compounding these challenges, some of the most common specification choices can 
contribute to substantial challenges and uncertainties for welfare estimation (Hensher and Greene 
2003).   An example is the specification of the coefficient on program cost within choice 
experiments (Hensher and Greene 2003; Train and Weeks 2005; Scarpa et al. 2007). Although 
the magnitude of this coefficient may vary across individuals, it is nonetheless expected to have 
an unambiguously negative sign, reflecting a positive marginal utility of income.  To ensure an 
appropriate sign for this coefficient within ML models, a common solution is to specify a 
lognormal distribution on the sign-reversed cost coefficient.  This solution, however, leads to 
well-known ambiguities for WTP estimation related to the long right-hand tail of the lognormal 
distribution, and often unrealistic mean WTP estimates over the unconstrained distribution 7 
 
(Hensher and Greene 2003; Train and Weeks 2005; Scarpa et al. 2007).  Given these challenges, 
one may truncate the distribution (e.g., Hensher and Greene 2003) estimate median (instead of 
mean) WTP over the lognormal distribution (Hu et al. 2005; Johnston and Duke 2007), estimate 
models in WTP-space (Train and Weeks 2005; Scarpa et al. 2007), use alternative distributions 
for the cost coefficient Hensher and Greene (2003)
 5, or model this parameter as non-random 
(e.g., Layton and Brown 2000),  but each of these options has potential shortcomings.  Even 
though this choice is only one of many facing ML modelers, it alone can result in substantial 
variation in welfare estimates (Hensher and Greene 2003; Layton and Lee 2006).   
Despite these and other challenges, most works in the literature display only one, or a 
very small number of ML model specifications, with little or no discussion of the robustness of 
model results to changes in assumptions regarding coefficient distributions, bounds or 
correlations.  While such considerations might be unimportant when the primary purpose of the 
analysis is methodological, or for policy contexts in which preference heterogeneity is 
inconsequential, they could be of crucial relevance in contexts such as agricultural land 
preservation, particularly when applied welfare estimates are used for policy guidance.   
 
IV. THE DATA 
                                                 
5 An alternative recommended by Hensher and Greene (2003, p. 146-148)  is the bounded triangular distribution. 
The triangular distribution is characterized as follows: “the … density function looks like a tent: a peak in the centre 
and dropping off linearly on both sides of the centre. Let c be the centre and s the spread. The density starts at c – s, 
rises linearly to c, and then drops linearly to c + s. It is zero below c – s and above c + s. The mean and mode are c. 
The standard deviation is s/√6; hence the spread is the standard deviation times √6. The height of the tent at c is 1/s 
[and] the slope is 1/s
2.”  If one specifies the distribution of a positive ML parameter with a triangular distribution 
bounded such that the mean (m) is equal to the spread (s), then “the density starts at zero, rises linearly to the mean, 
and then declines to zero again at twice the mean. It is peaked, as one would expect. It is bounded below at zero, 
bounded above at a reasonable value that is estimated, and is symmetric such that the mean is easy to interpret.”  For 
negative parameters the sign is reversed, but the shape of the distribution and interpretation remain identical. 
 8 
 
The empirical model seeks to quantify the practical implications of ML model specification for a 
welfare assessment involving government-sponsored PACE programs.  The goal of the analysis 
is the provision of heretofore unavailable welfare guidance for agricultural policy, emphasizing 
the role and relevance of preference heterogeneity as quantified using various modeling options.  
A secondary and broader goal is to illustrate the types and magnitude of welfare impacts that 
may be associated with seemingly minor and often unnoticed choices in ML model specification. 
The data are drawn from the SP survey entitled Purchasing Conservation Easements to 
Agricultural Land in Georgia, funded through a multi-state USDA National Research Initiative 
grant.
6 Details of the survey and research effort can be found in Boyle and Özdemir (2009), 
Paterson et al. (2004), Özdemir (2003) and Özdemir et al (2004).  Details of the multi-state 
PACE survey development and testing, including the 12 focus groups used in survey design, are 
summarized by Boyle and Ozdemir (2009). Insight from focus groups helped to ensure that the 
survey language and format could be easily understood by respondents, that respondents shared 
interpretations of survey terminology and scenarios, and that the scenarios captured policy 
attributes viewed as relevant and realistic by respondents.  Focus groups also led to a self-
administered mail survey, following a choice experiment framework (Adamowicz et al. 1998). 
Prior to the administration of choice questions, respondents were instructed to consult an 
information booklet that provided background information on PACE programs in Georgia, as 
well as detailed instructions included in the survey booklet.   Each choice question then asked 
respondents to consider  two hypothetical statewide PACE programs—Program A and Program 
B—that would each preserve specified quantities of land with varying programmatic priorities 
for farmland use, location, and land quality.  Each question also included a status quo response 
                                                 
6 The overall USDA National Research Initiative (NRI) grant project was entitled, “Improved Information in 
Support of a National Strategy for Open Land Policies”,  Kevin J. Boyle (Project Leader) with Mary Ahearn, Anna 
Alberini, John C. Bergstrom, Lawrence W. Libby, Michael P. Welsh (Project Cooperators). 9 
 
option, neither program, that involved no additional preservation. Each respondent was provided 
with four independent choice questions. Table 1 shows design attributes and levels that 
distinguished the presented conservation easement programs. As discussed by Boyle and 
Ozdemir (2009), choice questions were constructed using random assignment of attribute levels.
7 
The Georgia PACE survey was mailed to a random sample of 1,000 Georgia households in the 
spring of 2002, with follow-up mailings following Dillman (2000).  A total of 213 completed 
questionnaires were returned.  After adjusting for undeliverable questionnaires due to bad 
mailing addresses (175) and people who returned the questionnaire blank (19), the effective 
response rate to the survey was 26.4%. This response rate was similar to parallel PACE surveys 
conducted in Maine and Ohio under the original NRI grant referenced above.     
 
V. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
As the purpose of this analysis is to characterize the potential impact of common variations in 
ML specification for model estimates and policy guidance, we follow traditions of the literature 
and illustrate a range of specifications consistent with the types of models which often appear.  
Our purpose is not to identify the correct or best model, but rather to characterize variations in 
results that can result from commonly applied specifications. As a foundation for subsequent 
modeling, we begin with a baseline empirical specification in which utility is given by  
) )( (    ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 0 ASC P ASC v j j D μ z α j        ,   [4] 
where ASC0 is the alternative specific constant for the no program status quo, zj is a vector of 
                                                 
7 This experimental design strategy was selected given the emphasis placed by the funding agency on estimating 
interaction effects between attributes.  There has been substantial emphasis, and some controversy, in the more 
recent literature over the suitability of random designs (Lusk and Norwood 2005), with some researchers pointing 
out possible risks in such designs (Carson et al. 2009).  Lusk and Norwood (2009) argue that there are instances in 
which random designs may be more appropriate than conventional fractional factorial design strategies.  Readers 
should consider results of the present choice experiment in light of the random assignment design that was applied. 10 
 
non-price program characteristics such as the number of acres and type of land preserved, Pj is 
the unavoidable price or household cost of the program entered with sign-reversal (Hensher and 
Greene 2003)
8, D is a vector of socioeconomic attributes, and the conforming vector of 
coefficients to be estimated is given by ρ = [δ, α, γ, μ].  The subscript j references unique 
preservation options.  Following standard practice, the inclusion of interactions with D allows 
baseline utility under the status quo to vary according to socioeconomic attributes. 
From [4] a variety of ML models may be derived, each with different distributions of 
random coefficients over individual respondents i. For the full set of coefficients in the model,  ρ, 
these may be characterized by the general form ρi = ρ + Γvi, where ρ is the vector of population 
means, vi is a vector of individual heterogeneity components with a mean of zero and standard 
deviation of one, and Γ is a triangular matrix with coefficient standard deviations σk on the 
diagonal.  Off-diagonal elements of Γ are zero when random coefficients are uncorrelated; with 
free correlation Γ becomes an unrestricted triangular matrix (Greene 2007). This specification 
encompasses numerous variants. Of these, seven specifications are chosen for estimation here, 
selected to exemplify models common in the literature:   
Model I:   δi  =  δ;  
αi  =  α;  
γi  =  γ;  
μi = 0; 
Γ = 0; 
Model II:   δi =  δ + σδvi, vi ~ N[0,1];  
αi =  α + σαvi, vi ~ N[0,1];  
γi = γ;  
μi = 0; 
Γ = diag(σ1, σ2 …, , σK); 
Model III:   δi =  δ + σδvi, vi ~ N[0,1];  
                                                 
8 That is, program cost is entered into the data with a negative sign, such that the expected value for the associated 
parameter γ is positive. 11 
 
αi =  α + σαvi, vi ~ N[0,1];  
γi = γ;  
μi = 0; 
Γ unrestricted (i.e., correlated random coefficients); 
Model IV:   δi =  δ + σδvi, vi ~ N[0,1];  
αi =  α + σαvi, vi ~ N[0,1];  
γi = γ + γvi, vi ~ triangle[-1,1];   
μi = 0; 
Γ = diag(σ1, σ2 …, , σK); 
Model V:   δi =  δ + σδvi, vi ~ N[0,1];  
αi =  α + σαvi, vi ~ N[0,1];  
γi = γ + γvi, vi ~ triangle[-1,1];   
μi = μ; 
Γ = diag(σ1, σ2 …, , σK); 
Model VI:   δi =  δ + σδvi, vi ~ N[0,1];  
αi =  α + σαvi, vi ~ N[0,1];  
γi = exp(γ + σγvi), vi  ~ N[0,1];   
μhi = 0; 
Γ = diag(σ1, σ2 …, , σK); 
Model VII:   δi =  δ;  
αi =  α;  
γi = exp(γ + σγvi), vi  ~ N[0,1];   
μi = 0; 
Γ = diag(σ1, σ2 …, , σK); 
Differences between the seven models may be described succinctly.  Model I is a standard CL 
model.  Models II and III are ML models with parameters on the ASC and on all non-price 
program attributes specified as random with a normal distribution. Model II allows no correlation 
among random parameters, while Model III allows free correlation. All of these models include a 
non-random coefficient on program cost and no interactions between the ASC and 
socioeconomic attributes. Model IV is identical to II, save that program cost is random with a 
bounded triangular distribution following Hensher and Greene (2003)
9 Model V is similar to IV, 
but also includes interactions between socioeconomic attributes and the ASC, thereby modeling 
                                                 
9 Additional applications of this distribution are cited by Balcombe et al. (2009). The illustrated specification 
constrains the parameter to lie between 0 and 2γ. 12 
 
preference heterogeneity using both fixed and random effects.  Model VI is also similar to IV, 
except that program cost is assumed to have a lognormal distribution rather than triangular.  
Finally, Model VII is identical to I, except that program cost is considered to be random with a 
lognormal distribution.  These features are summarized in table 2. 
All specifications are consistent with theory.  For example, all ML models constrain the 
sign of the parameter on sign-reversed program cost (γi) to the positive domain, as suggested by 
economic theory. In addition, all models reflect specifications common in the applied valuation 
literature. All ML models are estimated using simulated maximum likelihood with 100 Halton 
draws per likelihood simulation; the CL model is estimated using maximum likelihood. 
 
VI. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Table 3 defines independent variables included in the estimated models. Table 4a,b presents 
model results. All models are significant at p<0.0001 based on likelihood ratio tests. Measures of 
model fit suggest reasonable performance of each model relative to prior models found in the 
literature, with significant coefficients and value surfaces conforming to prior expectations.  
General patterns also comport with CL results of the parallel PACE survey conducted in Maine 
under the same NRI grant (Boyle and Ozdemir 2009).  Although some models outperform others 
according to standard statistical tests, all provide reasonable estimates of the type that are 
commonly used for policy guidance. 
Following traditions in the recent literature, we emphasize implications for both implicit 
prices and compensating surplus, each calculated using standard approaches (cf., Morrison et al. 
2002; Hanley et al. 2006).
10  For the CL model, welfare measures are calculated using standard 
                                                 
10 Comparison of raw parameter estimates across models provides limited insight, as these are confounded with 
scale parameters.  Although there are established methods for testing the equivalence of parameters in logit models 13 
 
approaches, with empirical confidence intervals and significance levels simulated following Poe 
et al. (2005).  Because ML models include random coefficients, we estimate these measures 
using the welfare simulation of Johnston and Duke (2007), following standard methods 
illustrated by Hensher and Greene (2003) and Hu et al. (2005), among others. The procedure 
begins with a parameter simulation following the parametric bootstrap of Krinsky and Robb 
(1986), with R=500 draws taken from the mean parameter vector and associated covariance 
matrix. For each draw, resulting parameters are used to characterize asymptotically normal 
empirical densities for fixed and random parameters. For each of these R draws, a coefficient 
simulation is then conducted for each random coefficient, with S=200 draws taken from 
simulated empirical densities.
11 Here, all coefficient simulations draw from a normal distribution 
except that on cost, which draws from either a lognormal or bounded triangular distribution.  
Welfare measures are calculated for each draw, resulting in a combined empirical distribution of 
R×S observations from which summary statistics are derived. These distributions accommodate 
both the sampling variance of parameter estimates and the distribution of random parameters.   
For models with a non-random or bounded triangular distribution on the cost coefficient, 
we simulate welfare estimates as the mean over the parameter simulation of mean WTP 
calculated over the coefficient simulation (mean of mean WTP).  Models with the coefficient on 
cost distributed lognormal, with WTP simulated as the mean over the parameter simulation of 
mean WTP over the coefficient simulation, generated implausible WTP estimates and are hence 
excluded.  Similar findings have been reported by numerous authors, including Johnston and 
Duke (2007) and Hensher and Greene (2003).  Hence, for these models, we follow Johnston and 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Swait and Louviere 1993), these are not applied here given our emphasis on implications for policy guidance, 
which tends to rely on welfare estimates.   
11 One may also conduct these simulations with larger numbers of draws (Johnston and Duke 2007, 2009), but 
affects on model results in the present case are trivial. 14 
 
Duke (2007) and Hu et al. (2005) and simulate welfare estimates as the mean over the parameter 
simulation of median WTP calculated over the coefficient simulation (mean of median WTP).   
 
Sensitivity of Implicit Prices 
Table 5a,b illustrates resulting implicit price estimates from each model together with 
significance levels and 90% confidence bounds.  Table 5b also reports the percentage difference 
between the lowest and highest implicit price for each attribute in any of the seven models.  As 
shown by these results, implicit prices are at least moderately sensitive to changes in model 
specifications and in some cases vary to a substantial degree.  For statistically significant implicit 
prices, the largest differences tend to involve models with lognormal distributions on the cost 
parameter (Models VI and VII).  This is of particular note given the ubiquity of such 
specifications in the valuation literature.  In contrast, implicit price estimates are often robust 
across Models I through IV.    
There are exceptions, however, and most models include at least one idiosyncratic result.  
Some of these are highly relevant for policy guidance.  For example, implicit price distributions 
from Model III are wider than those found in other models, leading to reduced significance 
levels.  In two cases, implicit prices significant at p<0.05 in all other models (i.e., Vegetable, 
Hay) are not statistically significant in Model III. Similar patterns are found for other attributes 
and models.  For example, the implicit price for Acres is robust across Models I through V at 
values between 0.122 and 0.147.  This value, however, drops to 0.060 in Model VI and rises to 
0.255 in Model VII (a change of 325%).  Over all attributes and models, percentage differences 
between the lowest and highest implicit price range from 62.23% to 782.12%, a range similar to 
errors found in the benefit transfer literature when considering transfers across different sites (cf. 15 
 
Rosenberger and Stanley 2006).  Here we find similar variations across different models used to 
estimate implicit prices from the same site and survey data. 
Taken together, these results suggest that while implicit price estimates can be robust 
across CL and ML model specifications, large differences also occur.  These differences can 
result from modest changes to model specification.  For example, the sole difference between 
Models IV and VI is the assumed distribution of the parameter on program cost (bounded 
triangular vs. lognormal), together with associated differences in the welfare simulation.  As a 
result of this change, the implicit prices on Acres and Location both decrease by more than 50%, 
while the implicit price on Vegetable increases by approximately 30%.  Such results are not 
entirely surprising given prior findings that a lognormal distribution on program cost can have 
substantial implications for WTP (e.g., Hensher and Greene 2003).  Nonetheless, it is notable 
that these two ML model specifications, both common in the valuation literature, lead to such 
divergent conclusions.  These differences can lead to substantial increases in some estimated 
implicit prices, while decreasing others, still further complicating potential policy implications. 
The illustrated implicit price variations are likely to be most relevant when policy 
deliberations focus on the cardinal costs and benefits associated with marginal changes in PACE 
program design, e.g., whether the additional benefits of emphasizing prime farmland justify the 
costs.  In contrast, the ordinal ranking of implicit prices is largely (although not universally) 
robust across specifications.  For example, results over a wide range of specifications agree that a 
priority on land used for growing vegetables, berries, fruits and nuts (Vegetable) is among the 
most important positive attributes of a PACE program, while a priority on hay fields (Hay) is the 
most important negative aspect.  Hence, for the case of implicit prices, the practical relevance of 
the illustrated welfare sensitivity depends largely on the intended use of model results. 16 
 
 
Sensitivity of Compensating Surplus  
Notwithstanding the considerable insight available from implicit prices, compensating 
surplus (CS) assessments arguably provide a more relevant perspective for policy purposes, as 
benefit cost analyses commonly rely on these measures (Morrison et al. 2002).  Here, we assess 
CS differences for cases in which each of the seven models is treated as the “baseline” from 
which absolute value percentage differences are calculated, compared to analogous estimates 
from other “comparison” models. Given attribute levels in the experimental design (table 1), 
there are 96 unique combinations of conservation easement attributes for which welfare 
measures may be estimated.
12  Following convergent validity testing methods from the benefit 
transfer literature, we report the average absolute value difference between parallel CS measures 
over all 96 possible attribute combinations (Rosenberger and Stanley 2006). Differences are 
presented as trimmed mean (5%) absolute value percentages over all 96 policy options.    
Results are shown in Table 6. Illustrated CS differences provide a mixed message for the 
sensitivity of welfare estimates to changes in model specification.  Perhaps most noticeable is the 
large divergence of CS estimates derived from the CL model compared to those from ML 
specifications.  These large differences, combined with the more restrictive and sometimes 
unrealistic assumptions imposed by the former (Train 2009), suggest that researchers may wish 
to exercise caution when drawing policy conclusions from CL models.  Here, the average 
absolute value percentage difference between CS estimates across models is 126.72% when 
including all CL and ML model pairs.  When one excludes the CL model from comparisons, this 
difference drops to 27.67%.  That is, CS estimates from different ML models are much more 
                                                 
12 This number is derived by including all combinations of the acreages (4), locations (2), quality levels (2) and land 
types (6) possible given attribute levels in the experimental design. 17 
 
similar, on average, than those from CL and ML models. 
Whether the more modest average differences between CS estimates from competing ML 
specifications (ranging from 9.77% to 60.51%, and averaging 27.67%) are of concern for policy 
applications is context dependent,  as the required reliability and/or robustness for welfare 
measures depends on the level of accuracy deemed necessary in a given policy context (Ben-
Akiva, 1981; Bergstrom and De Civita, 1999; Johnston and Rosenberger 2010).  It has been 
suggested that acceptable accuracy is a function of the precision necessary for different types of 
decisions (Navrud and Pruckner 1997).  For example, higher degrees of precision may be needed 
as one moves from broad cost-benefit analyses for information gathering or project screening to 
calculation of compensatory amounts in negotiated settlements and litigation (Rosenberger and 
Johnston 2009). Given the variations in average CS estimates  shown in Table 6, it would seem 
that these estimates would be most suitable for use in cases where somewhat broader welfare 
guidance—as opposed to highly precise point estimates—are required.  Again, the percentage 
differences between models often rival those found in the benefit transfer literature when 
comparing welfare estimates from different studies at different sites—highlighting the potential 
magnitude and policy relevance of implications for welfare estimates. 
 
Implications for Policy Prioritization 
In cases where decision-makers seek monetized benefit measures, comparative welfare 
assessments such as those above can provide guidance concerning expected bounds of sensitivity 
analysis.  In other cases, however, including many relevant to farmland preservation, 
policymakers may desire only a welfare grounded means to prioritize preservation options (Duke 
and Aull-Hyde 2002; Jiang, Swallow and McGonagle 2005; Messer 2006).  In such cases, the 18 
 
emphasis is not on the convergent validity of welfare estimates but rather on the transferability of 
resultant policy rankings—results that may remain robust even if welfare estimates fail 
convergent validity tests or are associated with large variation across models.  Such issues are of 
particular relevance for PACE programs, as ranking approaches are common in the decision 
making of farmland preservation planners (Duke and Johnston 2009).   
To assess the robustness of welfare-based rankings farmland easement policies, the N=96 
policy options addressed above are ranked (1 to 96) based on average per household CS for each 
option, with unique rankings calculated for each of the seven models.  These model-specific 
rankings are compared to those from other models, providing 21 cross-model comparisons of 
policy rankings.  Correlations among rankings for each possible model pair are calculated using 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ).  Results are shown in table 7. 
As shown by Table 7, welfare based policy rankings across sites are highly correlated.  
The average correlation (ρ) across all model pairs is 0.94, with ρ > 0.9 for 19 out of 21 pairs.  In 
contrast to results of tables 5 and 6, which provide mixed results regarding the robustness of  
welfare estimates across model specifications, results in Table 7 suggest clear robustness when 
welfare estimates are used solely to prioritize policy options.  Across many model pairs there is a 
near perfect correlation among welfare based policy rankings for PACE programs.   The strength 
of these correlations is particularly notable given the magnitude of average CS differences across 
the same models, which ranges from 9.77% to 884.26%.  The contrast of these empirical 
outcomes demonstrates that, at least for the PACE policy context, the intended use of benefit 
estimates is a critical factor when assessing the confidence that one should place in model 
results.  That is, even though CS estimates can vary to a large degree depending on CL and ML 
model specification choices, these variations may have little or no impact on associated policy 19 
 
prioritization.  Hence, as concluded above in the assessment of implicit prices, the practical 
relevance of welfare sensitivity depends critically on the intended use of welfare estimates. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
As noted by Layton and Lee (2006, p. 52), “the growing sophistication of our econometric 
literature serves to highlight an uncomfortable fact – we still do not know the true model.”  This 
has not prevented common policy analyses from drawing upon results of individual ML models, 
with little attention to the possible sensitivity of welfare estimates to a range of reasonable 
functional forms. This paper provides insight regarding the sensitivity of welfare estimates and 
practical policy guidance to common variations in ML specification—the econometric fine print.  
As in most empirical assessments, there are a variety of analyses that are omitted and many 
topics that remain unexplored.  For example, the specific empirical results reported here apply 
only to our particular case study addressing agricultural PACE programs in Georgia. In addition, 
as in all works in the applied valuation literature, the model specifications illustrated here are at 
least to some degree ad hoc, chosen primarily to represent specifications common in the 
literature.  These and other limitations aside, the analysis provides a variety of insights relevant 
to the estimation and practical use of welfare estimates from discrete choice experiments.   
Model results suggest that greater attention should be paid to practical policy implications 
of even seemingly-minor changes in model specification, particularly given the flexibility of the 
ML model and the large number of different specifications that appear in the literature.  This 
econometric fine print can have substantial implications for welfare estimates.  Here we find the 
potential for particularly large impacts on implicit prices.  While CS estimates are somewhat 
more robust on average, even these can vary to a degree that may be unacceptable for many 20 
 
types of policy analysis.  Indeed, variations from often unnoticed ML specification changes can 
lead to welfare consequences of a similar magnitude to those found in benefit transfers between 
different sites.  Yet, while policy implications of errors in benefit transfer are a primary focus in 
that literature (Rosenberger and Stanley 2006), similar concerns for applied policy analysis 
related to ML model specification are often overlooked.  Policy rankings, in contrast, appear 
robust across different CL and ML model specifications—providing encouraging news for those 
who seek to use results to prioritize policies rather than to quantify welfare change. 
At a minimum, results suggest that additional emphasis should be given to sensitivity 
analysis in ML welfare analysis.  The common practice of providing results for one or two ML 
choice experiment models, can mask large variations in welfare estimates across a range of 
seemingly reasonable model specifications.  Attention to robustness is particularly relevant in 
discrete choice experiments given almost unavoidable uncertainty concerning the “true” or 
“best” model (Layton and Lee 2006; Louviere 2006). 
From a broader perspective, results highlight the importance of research into the practical 
implications of welfare estimation methods.  These implications tend to be overlooked by a 
valuation literature that tends to emphasize methodological advances, often at the expense of  
high quality, well-documented, and well-tested empirical estimates (Johnston and Rosenberger 
2010). As stated by McComb et al. (2006, p.471), “[p]ressure from publications to create novel 
methods or formulations has resulted in an abundance of studies that are distant from the day-to-
day needs of policy makers…”  Among these needs is more reliable information on the 
confidence that may be placed on welfare point estimates and associated policy guidance, given 
the potential sensitivity of these outputs to often-overlooked statistical variations.  
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Table 1.  Attributes and Attribute Levels Included in the Georgia PACE Survey 
Attributes Attribute  Levels 
Commodity Produced  1. Grain Crops 
2. Vegetables, Berries, Fruit and Nut Crops 
3. Hay 
4. Pasture Grass for Livestock 
5. Timber 
6. no priority 
Location  1. Near Urban Areas 
2. no priority 
Quality  1. Prime agricultural soil 
2. no priority 
Total Acres Preserved  1. 100,000 acres 
2. 500,000 acres 
3. 1,000,000 acres 
4. 2,000,000 acres 







  28 
 
Table 2. Summary of Model Specifications 
  Distribution of Parameters 
(F=fixed, N=normal, L=lognormal, T=bounded triangular) 
  Model Specification 
Parameters I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Neither (ASC)  F N N N N N F 
Acres  F N N N N N F 
Location  F N N N N N F 
Quality  F N N N N N F 
Grain  F N N N N N F 
Hay  F N N N N N F 
Pasture  F N N N N N F 
Vegetable  F N N N N N F 
Forest  F N N N N N F 




No No No No Yes No No 
Correlation Among 
Random Parameters 
N/A  No Yes No No No No 
a  Included as interactions with the ASC.   29 
 
Table 3. Model Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable   Description  Mean 
(Std. Dev.)
a
Neither (ASC)  Alternative specific constant identifying the status quo (no policy).  0.333 
(0.471) 
Acres  Total acres of easements purchased in Georgia under each conservation 
easement program, in 10,000 acre increments. 
59.689 
(72.024)     
Location  Binary (dummy) variable identifying policies that prioritize easement 
purchases near urban areas (versus the default of no priority). 
0.333 
(0.471) 
Quality  Binary (dummy) variable identifying policies that prioritize easement 
purchases of prime farmland (versus the default of no priority). 
0.325      
(0.469)      
Grain  Binary (dummy) variable identifying policies that prioritize easement 
purchases of land used for grain crops (versus the default of no priority). 
0.115      
(0.319)      
Hay  Binary (dummy) variable identifying policies that prioritize easement 
purchases of land used for hay (versus the default of no priority). 
(0.117)      
(0.322)     
Pasture  Binary (dummy) variable identifying policies that prioritize easement 




Vegetable  Binary (dummy) variable identifying policies that prioritize easement 
purchases of land used for growing vegetables, berries, fruits and nuts 
(versus the default of no priority). 
(0.110)     
(0.312)      
Forest  Binary (dummy) variable identifying policies that prioritize easement 
purchases of land used for timber (versus the default of no priority). 
(0.112)      
(0.316)    
Birth_Date  The year during which the survey respondent was born.  1952.35     
(14.633)     
College  Binary (dummy) variable identifying college graduates.  (0.522)      
(0.500)      
Hi_Income  Binary (dummy) variable identifying respondents with a household 
income of $60,000 or greater. 
(0.447)      
(0.497)      
Cost (negative)  Unavoidable one-time household cost (2002 dollars), with sign reversal.  (-10.991)    
(15.344) 
a  Includes zeros for the ‘status quo’ option. 
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Table 4a. Estimation Results—Conditional and Mixed Logit Models I-IV
a 

























































































Standard Deviations of Parameter Distributions    






















































Std Dev Cost  -- -- --  0.0339***
c 
(0.0080)













2 0.05  0.30 0.33  0.30
N  803 803 803  803
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Table 4b. Estimation Results—Mixed Logit Models V-VII
a 





































































   
Demographic Interactions   
Neither*Birth_date  0.0162 
(0.0360)
-- -- 
Neither*College  -1.8378 
(1.2919)
-- -- 
Neiher*Hi_Income  2.8554** 
(1.1464)
-- -- 
   
Standard Deviations of Parameter Distributions    








































Std Dev Forest  1.7024*** 2.6040***  -- 32 
 
(0.6639) (0.8020)




















2 0.29 0.30 0.28 
N  752 803 803 
a  Standard errors in parentheses. Single (*), double (**) and triple (***) asterisks denote significance levels of 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.   
b  Spread of the triangular distribution.  Model is constrained such that the parameter estimate is equal to the 
spread, to ensure a the parameter distribution lies in the positive domain. 
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Table 5a. Implicit Prices: Model Specifications I-IV
a 














































































Table 5b. Implicit Prices:  Model Specifications V-VII
 a 




































































a   Bounds on empirical 90% confidence interval in parentheses. * p< 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
b Mean  WTP. 
c  Mean of Mean WTP (see text). 
d  Mean of Median WTP (see text). 
e  Absolute value percentage difference between lowest and highest implicit prices over Models I – VII. 
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Table 6.   Compensating Surplus Estimates: Average Absolute Value Percentage Differences 






  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII 
Model I  --  673.93%  489.15% 596.20% 529.67%  826.13% 884.26%
Model II  82.04%  --  23.40% 9.77% 16.41%  21.55% 32.42%
Model III  77.41%  31.58%  -- 21.02% 10.79%  60.51% 73.37%
Model IV  81.02%  11.52%  16.47% -- 8.79%  34.24% 46.19%
Model V  80.00%  20.40%  9.39% 10.24% --  46.31% 58.92%
Model VI  85.18%  17.22%  36.63% 25.04% 30.92%  -- 12.14%
Model VII  87.14%  24.18%  41.91% 31.14% 36.95%  10.70% --
      
      All  Models 
All Mixed Logit 
Models  
 
Mean Percentage Difference   126.72%  27.67%     
a   5% trimmed mean in absolute percentage difference calculated over 512 possible conservation easement attribute 
combinations for each model. 
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Table 7.  Welfare-Based Policy Rankings: Spearman Rank Correlations across Models I-VII 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII 
Model I  1.000  --  -- -- --  -- --
Model II  0.988  1.000  -- -- --  -- --
Model III  0.918  0.947  1.000 -- --  -- --
Model IV  0.905  0.937  0.840 1.000 --  -- --
Model V  0.986  0.995  0.934 0.935 1.000  -- --
Model VI  0.904  0.928  0.856 0.945 0.933  1.000 --
Model VII  0.988  0.992  0.924 0.940 0.983  0.922 1.000
a   Correlation of rankings among  96 possible conservation easement attribute combinations for each model. 
 
 
 